While the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program is one of the largest safety net programs in the U.S., research on its benefits is limited. This paper exploits plausibly exogenous changes in state UI laws to empirically estimate whether UI generosity mitigates any of the previously documented negative health effects of job loss. The results show higher UI generosity increases health insurance coverage and utilization, with stronger effects during periods of high unemployment rates. During such periods, higher UI generosity also leads to improved self-reported health. Finally, I find no effects on risky behaviors nor on health conditions.
Introduction
The Great Recession was one of the deepest and longest recessions in the post World War II period, with the unemployment rate increasing from 4.6 to 9.6 percent between 2007 and 2010 (U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics). In response to the crisis, the U.S. Congress authorized unprecedented expansions to the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program, lengthening the maximum duration of benefits from 26 to as high as 99 weeks (Rothstein, 2011) . As a result of both the depth of the recession and the expansion of the program, UI spending increased substantially, making it the largest U.S. safety net program during this period (Bitler and Hoynes, 2016) .
The significant increase in the size of the UI program, coupled with the slow recovery of the labor market after the recession, has spurred renewed interest in estimating the effects of UI on job search and exit from unemployment, and how these affect the optimal level of UI payments.
1
Because the theory of optimal UI insurance (Baily, 1978; Chetty, 2006) holds that benefit amounts should be set at a level where the costs of the program (the moral hazard effects) should equal its benefits (reduced income fluctuations), the size of this moral hazard is key in calculating the optimal level of UI. On the other hand, understanding and estimating the benefits of UI is equally important, but the literature on these benefits is limited. 2 Given that the literature on job loss has shown that job displacement leads to significant negative effects on earnings, health and mortality (Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993; Stevens, 1 For example, see Rothstein (2011) ; Hagedorn et al. (2013) ; Schmieder, Von Wachter and Bender (2012) ; Landais, Michaillat and Saez (2018) ; Kroft and Notowidigdo (2016) ; Lalive, Landais and Zweimüller (2015) .
1997; Sullivan and Von Wachter, 2009; Schaller and Stevens, 2015) , UI could play an important role in mitigating these effects. In this paper, I concentrate on previously unexamined potential benefits of UI on the well-being of its recipients by empirically estimating the effect of UI generosity on the health insurance coverage, health status and health risk behaviors of the unemployed.
Understanding the health effects of UI is not only interesting because health represents an important aspect of individuals' well-being, but also because it creates important externalities, 3 whose presence implies different optimal levels of UI benefits than those previously found.
Unemployment Insurance (UI) is likely to affect health through different channels. First, UI can operate through an income effect among those receiving UI. Higher UI payments may imply higher investments in health, leading to improved health, and/or increases in risky behaviors, such as smoking and alcohol consumption, which may lead to negative health effects. Thus my analysis contributes to the literature on the causal relationship between income and health. Second, all individuals living in more generous UI states may experience less economic uncertainty, which reduces stress, independent of their employment status and UI take-up. Hence higher UI payments could lead to improved mental health and to decreases in smoking, alcohol consumption and illnesses associated with stress among all individuals, although one would expect much larger effects for the unemployed. Third, UI leads to longer unemployment spells and decreased time spent working among job losers, which could affect health through changes in time use. Overall, the expected effect of UI generosity on health is ambiguous.
My empirical strategy relies on exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in the level of UI payments caused by changes in state UI laws, similar to Gruber (1997) . For this purpose, I have built a UI calculator for 1993-2015 based on state UI laws, which allows me to calculate the 3 For example, while drinking and smoking lead to negative externalities, improved mental health and increased healthy behaviors may have important positive spillovers (Marcus, 2013; Yakusheva, Kapinos and Eisenberg, 2014) . Moreover, the uninsured cause financial externalities to hospitals (and other providers) who bear the costs of providing them uncompensated care (Garthwaite, Gross and Notowidigdo, 2018; Finkelstein, Mahoney and Notowidigdo, 2017) .
as a control group for the unemployed, which allows me to control for health shocks at the state and year level that affect the employed and unemployed equally.
The results obtained with the SIPP data show that a 1 standard deviation increase in UI generosity is associated with a $22 increase in monthly UI benefits, and a 1.6 percent increase in health insurance coverage, which is driven by private health insurance coverage. Importantly, the event studies rule out differential pre-trends in insurance coverage, and show that UI only affects insurance status after job loss. Moreover, the results are robust to a variety of specification checks and placebo analyses.
The BRFSS results confirm the effects on insurance coverage, and show that higher UI generosity leads to increases in having a routine check-up and having a breast exam. These effects are stronger during periods of high unemployment rates, when the need for UI may be highest. During such periods, higher UI generosity also leads to improved self-reported general health status.
Moreover, I find little evidence of significant short-term effects of UI on risky behaviors, such as alcohol consumption or smoking, and I find no effects on health conditions such as diabetes and blood pressure.
Background 2.1 Unemployment Insurance
Unemployment Insurance (UI) is a joint federal-state social insurance program that provides temporary cash payments to help alleviate economic hardship for individuals who experience job loss through no fault of their own. Although the program is federally mandated, it is subject to state laws regarding program eligibility and the level and duration of UI payments. Typically, individuals are eligible for up to 26 weeks of payments, but the Extended UI program provides additional weeks during periods in which states experience high unemployment rates. Moreover, Congress has the power to enact further extensions during recessions under the Emergency UI program, as it did during the Great Recession.
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The typical weekly UI statutory replacement rate, defined as the UI payment as a share of preunemployment weekly earnings, is 50 percent of such earnings (Kroft and Notowidigdo, 2016) .
However, each state establishes a nominal minimum and a maximum level of UI payments, as well as minimum earnings for eligibility for the program, making the actual replacement rate nonlinear in earnings. Therefore, individual replacement rates may vary significantly from the average.
While the statutory earnings replacement rate and the dependent allowance are fairly constant within states over time, states change the maximum and minimum amounts of UI payments frequently, 4 to either keep up with inflation or when UI funds are low (Smith and Wenger, 2013) .
Given these changes in the nonlinearity of the replacement rates, UI generosity varies within states across time. Moreover, some states provide small additional allowance for dependents (mainly children), 5 which provides additional variation within states and across number of children. The identification strategy in this paper relies on taking advantage of these sources of variation in UI generosity.
Panel (a) of Figure (1) These graphs illustrate the substantial variation in generosity across states, as well as the smaller, but still sizable variation across number of dependents and within states over time. My empirical strategy exploits this variation, and its exogeneity will be discussed below in Section 4.
Relevant Literature
This paper contributes to the literatures on UI, job loss, and the effects of government programs on health. The first body of work analyzes the effects of UI and its optimal level of benefits. In large part, this literature focuses on analyzing the effect of UI on job search and unemployment duration, known as the moral hazard effect (Meyer, 1990; Card and Levine, 2000; Rothstein, 2011) . This collection of work finds that higher UI payments and longer durations lead to reduced job search and longer unemployment spells. In addition, recent work has analyzed the differential effects of UI on duration across varying liquidity constraints and business cycles (Card, Chetty and Weber, 2007; Chetty, 2008; Kroft and Notowidigdo, 2016; Schmieder, Von Wachter and Bender, 2012) .
The literature on the benefits of UI is more limited and is primarily focused on the consump-Gruber, 2000; Hsu, Matsa and Melzer, 2018; Barr and Turner, 2015; Cylus, Glymour and Avendano, 2014) . Note that some of these effects could be mechanisms for improved health, as changes in labor supply and college enrollment could affect the availability of cheaper employer or college provided health insurance.
The two closest papers to my own are Brown (2010) and Cylus, Glymour and Avendano (2015) , which analyze whether UI generosity affects private health insurance coverage and self-reported health, respectively. My paper significantly contributes to this small literature in several ways.
First, I provide a more expansive and comprehensive analysis by going beyond health insurance coverage and examining the effects of UI on health utilization, health status, and healthy behaviors, which are ultimately the main outcomes of interest for policy. Second, I use a longer time period and variation at the state, year and number of children level, which allows me to control for state fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends. These controls are important given persistent underlying differences in UI generosity across states that could be correlated with differences in health outcomes. Third, my paper is the first to provide direct evidence on the two main identification assumptions necessary for the causal interpretation of the estimates. The first of these assumptions is that state UI laws are exogenous to unobserved health status. Hence, I show that UI generosity is not correlated to state economic conditions or other welfare programs that could be correlated with health. The second assumption is the absence of pre-trends in health, in support of which I estimate event study analyses and show the absence of pre-trends prior to job loss. Lastly, my specification choices rule out several sources of bias that could afflict the prior two papers.
8
A second important and relevant strand of literature is the one analyzing the negative effects of 8 For example, compared to Brown (2010), I use simulated replacement rates that are constructed with a fixed sample of unemployed that does not vary each year, and I do not control for endogenous (outcome) variables. Compared to Cylus, Glymour and Avendano (2015) , I analyze health outcomes during the time of unemployment, and not one to two years afterwards, when the individual might no longer be treated.
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Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology job loss on health. 9 For example, job displacement is associated with increased mortality (Sullivan and Von Wachter, 2009; Browning and Heinesen, 2012; Eliason and Storrie, 2009 ), which could be driven by decreased cardiovascular health (Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2015) , increased risky behaviors (Deb et al., 2011; Classen and Dunn, 2012) , and increased suicide risk and hospitalization due to mental health problems (Kuhn, Lalive and Zweimüller, 2009) . Another important mechanism that could lead to worsening health status is the loss of health insurance coverage incurred after displacement (Gruber and Madrian, 1997), since in the U.S. around 88 percent of insurance coverage is acquired through the workplace (Brown, 2010) . My paper contributes to this literature by understanding how UI mitigates some of these negative effects.
Third, this paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between government programs and health. Studies of programs that directly provide health insurance and medical services find that Medicaid expansions for low-income adults are associated with higher health care utilization, lower out-of-pocket medical expenditures and debt, and improved self-reported health (Finkelstein et al., 2012; Baicker et al., 2013) . Government programs can affect health not only through the direct provision of insurance and medical services, but also through income effects. For example, increases in government welfare and nutrition programs are associated with increased health insurance coverage, health utilization, and self-reported health (Bitler, Gelbach and Hoynes, 2005; Evans and Garthwaite, 2014; Hoynes, Page and Stevens, 2011; Hoynes, Schanzenbach and Almond, 2016) . Given that UI provides temporary income to job losers, my work provides further evidence on the relationship between income and health. 9 The literature on job loss is extensive, finding that job displacement leads to significant earning losses (Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993; Stevens, 1997; Davis and Von Wachter, 2011) , increased spousal labor supply, increased probability of divorce, and decreased fertility (Stephens, 2002; Charles and Stephens, 2004; Lindo, 2010; Eliason, 2012) . Lastly, job loss has important intergenerational repercussions, leading to decreased children's educational achievement and infant health (Oreopoulos, Page and Stevens, 2008; Rege, Telle and Votruba, 2011; Lindo, 2011; Stevens and Schaller, 2011 use data from the core modules, which include questions regarding health utilization, self-reported health, healthy or risky behaviors, and health conditions. Moreover, the core modules contain important demographic information, as well as current employment status and state of residence. The 13 While for a subsample of this data one could merge additional information from the SIPP topical waves that collect information on a few adult health outcomes, these questionaries are administered only once or twice in each panel, not allowing for a longitudinal analysis.
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The sample used for the analysis contains individuals who have been unemployed for less than one year, who are those more likely to be eligible for UI. Unfortunately, the BRFSS does not separately identify individuals that are unemployed because of job loss, or those who quit their previous jobs or are new entrants into the labor force. Therefore my unemployed sample is composed of both UI eligible and non-eligible individuals, which may lead to measurement error.
In addition to those unemployed for less than one year, my sample also includes individuals who are currently working for wages, who act as a control group in some of the empirical specifications.
Finally, I restrict my sample to individuals aged 18 to 60, similar to the SIPP, and I exclude all individuals with missing demographic information. After these restrictions, the unemployed and employed samples include 144,993 and 2,678,294 individuals, respectively.
To calculate UI weekly benefit eligibility in the SIPP, I use a UI calculator containing data on state UI laws that I constructed from a variety of sources. The main information was collected from the Employment and Training Administration, which reports semi-annual information on state payment schedules. Moreover, I supplemented this data with information from the calculators used in LaLumia (2013), Chetty (2008) and Gruber (1997) , as well as other state laws and documents. As explained above, the formula used to calculate payments varies by state and year, and includes the percent of earnings to be replaced by UI, a minimum and maximum amount of weekly payments, and a minimum amount of earnings required for eligibility to the program.
14 In addition, some states have an additional allowance depending on the number of children of the unemployed individual, which are incorporated into the calculations. 
Descriptive Statistics
Panel (a) of Appendix Table ( Panel (a) shows that involuntary job losers and the unemployed are more likely to be younger and male relative to the employed. They also tend to be more disadvantaged, as demonstrated by the higher likelihood of being black and the lower likelihood of having a college degree and being married. Moreover, column (2) shows that in the year prior to job loss, average annual earnings of involuntary job losers were $32,357. Panel (b) shows that average monthly UI in the main SIPP sample, for individuals observed 12 months before to 24 after job loss is substantial, and equal to $145. Moreover, it shows that job losers and the unemployed fare worse relative to the employed among a wide set of health outcomes and risky behaviors.
Before moving to the discussion of the empirical strategy, I provide some descriptive evidence from the SIPP to motivate the main analysis. To do so, for each involuntary job loser in the 1996-2013 SIPP I calculate a) their simulated replacement rate in the month of job loss, and b) the difference in UI benefits and insurance coverage in the 24 months after relative to the 12 months before job lob loss.
In Appendix Figure Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology health insurance coverage. These relationships contain variation stemming also from cross-state differences, but my empirical strategy will mainly rely on within state variation. Hence, I next collapse the individual data to obtain state-year average replacement rates and differences in UI and insurance upon job loss. Appendix Figure ( A.2) plots the long-term changes in these averages between 2013 and 1996, for each state separately. Again, the results show that larger increases in UI generosity are correlated with larger increased in UI benefits and insurance coverage, suggesting a causal role for UI.
Empirical Strategy
My overall identification strategy relies on variation in UI generosity within states and across number of children and time that is driven by changes in state UI laws. In this section, I first describe how I construct this measure, then I describe the empirical specifications that I employ for each of my two main data sources, and last I discuss possible threats to identification. (Currie and Gruber, 1996b; Gruber, 1997; Moffitt and Wilhelm, 1998; Cohodes et al., 2016). 18 This is important in the case of UI, since its payment formula is a nonlinear function of individual earnings, with higher earnings implying lower replacement rates due to the maximums in UI levels.
Simulated UI Replacement Rate
Given that higher earnings are correlated with improved health, using individual replacement rates without fully controlling for earnings might lead to downward biased estimates of the effect of UI on health.
SIPP
Given the SIPP is a longitudinal survey, for which I created a panel of job losers 12 months before to 24 months after job loss, I assign each job loser a simulated replacement rate according to the year, state and number of kids in the month of job loss. I then estimate the following specification:
where i, c, s, and t represent individual, number of children, state and year, respectively. H is the health outcome of interest, RR is the simulated replacement rate, and L is an indicator equal to 1 in the 24 months after job loss. X includes demographic controls, such as indicators for age, marital 17 As a robustness check, I also re-estimate the baseline SIPP results with a measure of UI generosity that varies by age and gender to increase the precision of the estimates. To do so, I calculate replacement rates exactly as in the baseline model, except that in the final step I collapse the data to the year, state, number of children, gender and age group cell. These results, shown in Table   A .4, show slightly more precise but overall very similar results to the baseline. 18 An additional benefit of a simulated instrument is that it provides one unique measure of program generosity that includes all the features of state policies. In this model, 1 is the main coefficient of interest, representing the differential effect of UI after job loss, when the individual is eligible for UI. Importantly, given that I include individual effects, the analysis exploits within-individual variation in health. 20 Moreover, after controlling for ⌫ c ⇤ L, ✓ t ⇤ L and s ⇤ L, the remaining major sources of variation in UI generosity that I use for identification are differences in UI generosity within states across number of children, and within states over time. Thus one of the main identification assumptions is that these differences in state UI generosity are not correlated with other factors that affect individual changes in health outcomes upon job loss.
Note that the longitudinal aspect of the data also allows for a more flexible, and convincing, model relative to Equation (1). For all baseline results, I estimate event study analyses similar to Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993) by creating dummy variables for all (two-month) periods before and after job loss, and interacting these dummies with the replacement rate, with all other aspects of the models identical to Equation (1). This specification allows me to estimate the differential impacts of UI in each month prior and after job loss, providing compelling evidence of the absence of differential pre-trends, the other main identification assumption in the analysis. 
where all variables are identified as in equation (1). Again, 1 is the main coefficient of interest, as it represents the average effect of UI among unemployment individuals. This analysis thus exploits across state, year and number of children variation in the health of the unemployed, with the main assumption being that changes in state UI laws are uncorrelated with other state health shocks.
Second, I employ a triple differences methodology, which uses the sample of employed individuals as a control group for the unemployed. This relies on the assumption that the employed are not affected by UI laws, and that the two groups have similar trends in health. By adding this group of individuals I can estimate triple differences regressions of the following form:
where U is an indicator that is equal to 1 if the individual is currently unemployed, and 0 if he is working. ⌫ c ⇤ U , ✓ t ⇤ U and s ⇤ U represent differential number of children, state and year fixed effects for the unemployed and the employed groups. In this model the effect of UI is captured by 2 , which represents the differential effect of UI for the unemployed compared to the employed.
These triple differences also allow for additional state-by-year-by-number of children fixed effects, which I include to absorb state level health shocks and differences in health by number of children and across states that are common to the two groups. Importantly, the main identification assumption in these triple differences models is that changes in state UI laws are uncorrelated with state level shocks that affect the unemployed differentially from the employed. The assumption in 00865 9
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this model is indeed weaker than that of the state and year fixed effects one.
Threats to Identification
Both SIPP and BRFSS empirical analyses rely on the assumption that differences in UI generosity Another possible threat to identification arises from the fact that if employed individuals are partially treated by UI, the estimated effects obtained with the SIPP and the BRFSS triple differences models may be downward biased, as these models capture the differential effect of UI for unemployed relative to employed individuals. Employed individuals may be in fact treated by UI through different channels. First, employed individuals could be receiving UI through other members of the household who could be unemployed. Second, larger UI generosity may reduce the stress of the employed by decreasing the uncertainty associated with the possibility of becoming unemployed. Third, larger UI payments could lead to longer job search and better job quality, which could improve health either through direct provision of health insurance coverage or through increased wages (Nekoei and Weber, 2017) . To address this issue, I will directly examine the effect of UI on the employed with both the SIPP and the BRFSS data.
A last threat to identification, relevant for the BRFSS analyses only, may be due to sample selection bias. Since the BRFSS data is cross-sectional, I can only identify individuals that are economic conditions does not affect the results. (Katz and Meyer, 1990; Rothstein, 2011; Kroft and Notowidigdo, 2016) . One might then worry that changes in sample composition might be driving the BRFSS results. The results from the SIPP analysis, however, greatly alleviate these concerns.
In that analysis I will show that the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of individual fixed effects, which control for unobserved preferences for health insurance coverage. Nevertheless, I
will address this issue further in Section 5.3.
Results
SIPP Analysis
Main Effects
Panel (a) of Figure ( 2) presents coefficients from the event study analysis estimating the effect of UI generosity on monthly UI benefits received, the "first-stage" relationship. Reassuringly, I
find zero effects of UI prior to job loss, and an immediate increase in UI benefits upon job loss.
This increase is smaller in the first two months, as applying and obtaining UI benefits may not be immediate, and largest in months 3 to 6 since job loss. 24 Panel (b) of Figure ( 2) contains event study results when analyzing the likelihood of health insurance coverage, and shows that higher UI generosity does not affect insurance coverage prior to job loss, but leads to a significant increase in insurance after job loss. Panels (c) and (d) show that these results are mainly driven by an increase in private health insurance, and not by Medicare/Medicaid. Importantly, none of the outcomes display trends prior to job loss, satisfying one of the major assumptions in these types of analyses. Table ( 2) show results from specification checks for the two main SIPP outcomes. In column (1) I present the baseline results shown in Table ( 
Panels (a) and (b) of
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show that excluding individual fixed effects does not significantly affect the baseline estimates.
This is important as it shows that within-person comparisons and comparisons across employed and unemployed individuals yield similar results, ruling out a significant role for selection bias in the estimated effects with the BRFSS cross sectional data. Moreover, the coefficient on the (uninteracted) replacement rate in column (2) suggests that UI leads to a small, positive, but statistically insignificant increase in insurance coverage among the employed, ruling out large effects of UI on the health insurance coverage of the employed.
Columns (3)- (6) In column (7) I test the importance of allowing the state, year and number of children fixed effects to differ prior and after job loss. While the qualitative results remain the same, omitting these controls changes the magnitude of the effects. Given the obvious differences in UI receipt between job losers and the employed, who are not eligible for UI, fixed effects that do now allow for differential effects by employment status may not be able to fully capture fixed state differences in UI receipt, suggesting that these types of controls may be fundamental.
In columns (8) to (11) I show the sensitivity of the results to including children-by-year-by-job loss, children-by-state-by-job loss and state-by-year-by-job loss fixed effects, which absorb various portions of the overall variation in UI generosity. The results show that including the first two sets 26 Specifically, I include cubic polynomials for the 1 and 2-year lags of both the state unemployment rate and net UI reserves. (1) and (2) of Appendix Table   ( A.6) contain the baseline results for involuntary job losers. In the next two columns, I present results when analyzing individuals that quit their job to start a new employment. Among this set of individuals, higher UI generosity leads to small, negative and statistically insignificant effects on UI receipt and health insurance coverage after the job separation. In the last two columns I include all individuals that experience a job separation during the SIPP panel, but whose separation is not due to not an involuntary job loss nor due to quitting to take another job. 27 Again, higher UI generosity does not lead to statistically significant increases in UI receipt nor health insurance.
BRFSS Analysis
Main Effects
The results in the prior subsections provide causal evidence that UI leads to increased health insurance coverage among job losers, and rule out a variety of possible threats to identification. Given 27 Reasons for these separations are varied, for example retirement, childcare or family obligations, illness and injury, schooling, being fired, etc.
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I present the results for health insurance coverage and health utilization in Table (3). This   table contains In column (1) of Table ( 3) I analyze whether UI generosity affects the likelihood of (any) health insurance coverage. Panel (a) shows that a 10 p.p. increase in the simulated replacement rate leads to a statistically significant 3.3 p.p. increase in the likelihood of having insurance. This effect is larger in size that the one estimate with the SIPP, but within its confidence interval. Panel (b) shows a small but statistically significant effect of UI on the health insurance of employed individuals, and a large, significant differential effect on the unemployed. As mentioned previously, it is plausible that the employed might be affected by UI generosity through multiple channels, and that the coefficients on the interaction between the replacement rate and the unemployed are a lower bound of the overall effect of UI on the unemployed. Lastly, Panel (c) shows that adding state-by-year-bynumber of children fixed effects does not alter the estimated effects on the unemployed, implying that changes in UI laws are not correlated to average state-level health shocks.
Column (2) on whether the respondent ever had a breast exam and whether she had one in the last year. I expect increased routine checkups in the last year to also increase breast cancer screenings in the same period, but I do not expect UI to have a strong effect on the likelihood of ever having a CBE, and this can act as a placebo test. Indeed, the results show that a 10 p.p. increase in the replacement rate leads to a 5 p.p. increase in the probability of having a CBE in the last year and to a small, statistically insignificant effect on the probability of ever having such an exam.
In Table ( outcomes both the number of healthy days, and whether they were healthy during the entire month.
It is important to note that while subjective, measures of self-reported health are good predictors of mortality (Idler and Benyamini, 1997; DeSalvo et al., 2006) .
The estimated effects are imprecisely estimated, with effects on self-reported health that are generally statistically significant at the 10 percent level. For example, the results in Panel (c) suggest that higher UI generosity leads to statistically significant 0.023 increase in general health and a marginally significant 0.85 p.p. increase in the likelihood of being in excellent health. These results are in in line with Cylus, Glymour and Avendano (2015), who find that higher state UI maximum payments lead to improved self-reported health for those experiencing job loss. The results obtained when analyzing the number of days in which the respondent felt physically or mentally healthy are mixed, with some evidence of improved physical health among the unemployed.
Appendix Table ( A.7) presents results obtained when analyzing risky behaviors such as BMI, smoking, alcohol consumption, and pregnancies. These results suggest that higher UI generosity does not lead to significant changes in the likelihood of obesity (defined as having BMI of 25 or larger), smoking behavior or pregnancy. The only significant effect is on binge drinking, defined 25 00865 9 I also analyze a variety of other health outcomes contained in the BRFFS, such as health conditions (high blood pressure, high cholesterol and diabetes), and female cancer prevention (mammographies). The analysis of these outcomes does not generally yield significant results, therefore I do not presents most of those results here. There are two explanation for these results. First, the zero results could be driven by real null effects of the program. Second, these health effects could be impossible to detect in the short-run, as these health conditions may need a longer time to develop. Importantly, my findings are similar to (Finkelstein et al., 2012) , who find that in the short-run providing free Medicaid to low-income adults increases their health utilization and self-reported health, but it does not lead to short-term improvements in health conditions.
Review of Economics and Statistics
Because I analyze a large number of outcomes, one could be concerned about inference and the risk of false positives. Hence, for each set of outcomes in the BRFSS (health utilization, selfreported health, and healthy behaviors) I perform a multiple hypothesis correction that controls for the false discovery rate (FDR), following Benjamini, Krieger and Yekutieli (2006) . After this correction, the statistical significance for the health utilization outcomes remains unchanged, while the effects on the other outcomes are generally statistically insignificant, and thus only suggestive.
Heterogeneity Analyses
Next, I explore whether the main estimated effects found in the BRFSS are differential across business cycles. East and Kuka (2015) provide evidence that UI's consumption smoothing effects are concentrated among individuals unemployed during the worst local economic conditions. Possible explanations for this finding are that UI payments are extended during periods of recessions and that UI take-up rates increase with the unemployment rate, which imply that during recessions increases in UI generosity are experienced for more months and among more individuals.
These mechanisms may also generate similar differential effects across cycles on health. If takeup is higher, or the duration of payments is greater, the total amount of income received increases, 26 00865 9
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In order to explore differential effects across cycles, I create two dummy variables that indicate whether the respondent lives in a state and year with an above or below median average state unemployment rate. 28 I interact these indicators with the simulated replacement rate. Panels (a) and (b) of Table (5) presents these results for the unemployed sample and the triple differences sample, respectively. These findings shows that indeed UI leads to larger beneficial effects on all outcomes of interest during periods of high unemployment rates compared to periods with low unemployment rates, although these coefficients are not always statistically significantly different from each other (as shown by the p-values obtained from testing the equality of the two coefficients). Interestingly, the effects on self-reported health are statistically significant during periods of high unemployment rates, even after adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing with the Benjamini, Krieger and Yekutieli (2006) procedure. In these periods, a 10 p.p. increase in UI generosity is estimated to lead to a 1-1.6 p.p. increase in the likelihood of feeling in excellent general health.
In Appendix Given that my measure of UI generosity is primarily a function of changes in UI laws regarding the maximum and minimum level of benefits, 30 I next examine whether the effects of UI differ when directly using these two parameters. In Panel (a) of Appendix Table ( A.9) I show the baseline results using the simulated replacement rate, and in the next two panels I present results when the measures of UI generosity are the (real) maximum or minimum benefit amounts, which capture variation in laws more likely to affect middle-high and lower income earners, respectively.
The results reveal interesting heterogeneity in the effects of the two UI programs parameters.
Using the maximum benefit I find strong effects on health insurance coverage and visiting a doctor for a routine checkup, but smaller, insignificant effects on the other health outcomes. Instead, the effects found using the minimum benefit are strong and statistically significant only for selfreported health. 31 Overall, the heterogeneity in the effects suggests that while health insurance coverage is expensive and might be affordable only to higher earning individuals, lower income individuals may experience improvements in health through channels that are different from health insurance coverage, such as reduced stress and increases in healthy behaviors.
Issues of Selection
As mentioned earlier, one possible concern with the identification strategy is that the sample of the unemployed in the BRFSS may be endogenous to UI laws, as higher UI generosity is associated with decreased job search and unemployment exit (Katz and Meyer, 1990; Rothstein, 2011) . If this moral hazard effect is correlated with unobserved characteristics that affect health, the measured effects of UI on health using the BRFSS data may be biased by changes in sample composition.
Two pieces of evidence minimize this worry. First, the SIPP analysis showed that including individual fixed effects, which control for fixed health characteristics of job losers, does not affect the 30 The correlations between the simulated replacement rate and the maximum and minimum level of benefits are 0.62 and 0.30, respectively. These results rule out a significant role for selection bias in driving the BRFSS estimates.
Nevertheless, I further address this concern by directly testing whether UI generosity affects sample composition in my data. Panels (a) and (b) of Appendix Table ( Review of Economics and Statistics Just Accepted MS. rest by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology cients out of 28 are statistically significant. 33 The absence of a significant relationship between UI and sample characteristics suggests that UI might also not be correlated with unobserved health, a third piece of evidence ruling out a role for selection bias.
Conclusion
Despite the importance of UI as part of the U.S. safety net, little is known about its benefits and whether the program mitigates some of the negative effects of job loss. Given that job loss has been associated with decreased health and increased mortality, this paper analyzes whether increases in UI generosity lead to improved health among the unemployed. To empirically estimate these effects, I use 1996-2013 longitudinal data from the SIPP and 1993-2015 cross-sectional data from the BRFSS. I first create a measure of UI generosity that depends on exogenous UI laws only, and not on the characteristics of the unemployed. Second, I relate this measure to the various health outcomes of the unemployed in both datasets.
The results show that higher UI generosity is associated with increased UI benefits, health insurance coverage and health utilization. These effects are stronger during recessions, when job uncertainty and its related stress may be higher. Moreover, during recessions UI also leads to improved self-reported general health status. Lastly, these results are robust to a variety of specification checks conducted with both the BRFSS and the SIPP.
My findings suggests that UI plays an important role in mitigating some of the negative health effects of job loss. Such improvements in health utilization and self-reported health are important as they may lead to significant positive health externalities on the family and the neighborhood, 33 Interestingly, one of the only two statistically significant effects is on the gender of the unemployed. This effect is not surprising, as males traditionally have higher UI participation rates, and therefore are more likely to respond to changes in UI. In heterogeneity analyses, I analyzed the differential effects of UI by gender, and the results showed that the effects are similar across males and females. 
